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1. Introduction 
 
Lest we forget what was actually said in 1948, Lord Greene stated:1  
 
It is true to say that, if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no 
reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere. That, I 
think, is quite right; but to prove a case of that kind would require something 
overwhelming …  It is not what the court considers unreasonable, a different thing 
altogether. If it is what the court considers unreasonable, the court may very well have 
different views to that of a local authority on matters of high public policy of this kind. 
Some courts might think that no children ought to be admitted on Sundays at all, some 
courts might think the reverse, and all over the country I have no doubt on a thing of 
that sort honest and sincere people hold different views. The effect of the legislation is 
not to set up the court as an arbiter of the correctness of one view over another. It is 
the local authority that are set in that position and, provided they act, as they have 
acted, within the four corners of their jurisdiction, this court, in my opinion, cannot 
interfere.  
 
Put like this, unreasonableness as a ground of review is a straightforward concept, based on 
sound constitutional principles and a useful longstop to deal with a residual category of 
patently bad decisions. It makes abundantly clear that the courts are to make a secondary 
decision, with the primary decision about the merits of the matter being left to public 
authorities.  The problem is that in the ensuing years we have heaped too much onto the 
unreasonableness test — we have attempted to make it too sophisticated,  and we have used it 
to carry out tasks it was never intended to deal with (notably, adjudicating on claims made 
under s.6 of the Human Rights Act). Wednesbury unreasonableness is in danger of imploding 
under the weight of expectations. 
 The general criticisms of unreasonableness as a basis of review are well-known and 
often repeated: it is a circular definition; it is an uncertain guide as to the extent of the 
“margin of discretion” to be permitted to a public authority in any given situation or (the flip 
side of the coin) the intensity of review to be conducted by the court; it is a cloak which may 
tempt lawyers and courts to deal with the merits of grievances rather than questions of 
legality. These conceptual weaknesses have led to proposals for the common law to recognise 
a number of substantive principles in place of unreasonableness (e.g., equality)2 or for the 
replacement of the reasonableness test with one of proportionality.3  
                                                 
 
1
 Associate Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223. 
2
 See J. Jowell and A. Lester, “Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of Administrative Law” [1987] P.L. 
368. 
3
 See the seminal essay by Jowell and Lester,  “Proportionality: Neither Novel Nor Dangerous” in  J. Jowell and 
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 Criticisms have also been made by the European Court of Human Rights.4 At home, 
our judges also make criticisms of Wednesbury or acknowledge the difficulties that beset it. In 
Daly, the prison cell searches case, Lord Cooke of Thorndon spared no punches:5  
And I think that the day will come when it will be more widely recognised that 
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 
223 was an unfortunately retrogressive decision in English administrative law, insofar 
as it suggested that there are degrees of unreasonableness and that only a very extreme 
degree can bring an administrative decision within the legitimate scope of judicial 
invalidation. The depth of judicial review and the deference due to administrative 
discretion vary with the subject matter. It may well be, however, that the law can 
never be satisfied in any administrative field merely by a finding that the decision 
under review is not capricious or absurd. 
 
In April 2003 in R. (on the application of Association of British Civilian Internees (Far East 
Region)) v Secretary of State for Defence the CA dealt, as a preliminary question, with 
whether proportionality exists as a separate ground of review in a case which does not 
concern Community law or human rights protected by the European Convention on Human 
Rights (“ECHR”). 6  David Pannick QC, for the claimants “boldly submitted” that it does; for 
the Secretary of State it was submitted that the CA was bound by previous authority to hold 
that it did not. Giving the single judgment of the Court, Dyson L.J. said that  
although we did not hear argument on the point, we have difficulty in seeing what 
justification there now is for retaining the Wednesbury test.  [35] But we consider that 
it is not for this court to perform its burial rites.  The continuing existence of the 
Wednesbury test has been acknowledged by the House of Lords on more than one 
occasion”.   
 
The CA therefore went on to “approach the issues in the present appeal on the footing that the 
Wednesbury test does survive, and that this is the correct test to apply in a case such as the 
present which does not involve Community law, and does not engage any question of rights 
under the ECHR”. 
 A month later in the House of Lords case R. (Pro-life Alliance) v BBC appeal, 
challenging a refusal to screen a party political broadcast, Lord Walker said:7  
The Wednesbury test, for all its defects, had the advantage of simplicity, and it might 
be thought unsatisfactory that it must now be replaced (when human rights are in play) 
by a much more complex and contextually sensitive approach. But the scope and reach 
of the Human Rights Act is so extensive that there is no alternative. It might be a 
mistake, at this stage in the bedding-down of the Human Rights Act, for your 
Lordships’ House to go too far in attempting any comprehensive statement of 
principle. But it is clear that any simple “one size fits all” formulation of the test 
would be impossible. 
 
The stage is therefore set for a conceptual battle between irrationality and proportionality and, 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
D. Oliver, eds., New Directions in Judicial Review (Stevens, London, 1988). 
4
 See below. 
5
 R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Daly [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 A.C. 532. 
6
 [2003] EWCA Civ 473; [2003] Q.B. 1397. 
7
 [2003] UKHL 23; [2003] 2 W.L.R. 1403 (May 15, 2003). 
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in relation to some unqualified Convention rights, merits review.  
 
2. Basic distinctions between domestic law and Convention rights 
 
For going further, it may be helpful to state the obvious.8 It is both possible and desirable to 
make a distinction between (a) situations where duties and rights stemming from English law 
are at stake and (b) those where Convention rights are relied upon.  These two streams of law 
have different purposes.  The orthodox grounds of judicial review in English law — those 
falling under the “chapter heads” of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety — 
regulate the legality of public authority decision-making by guarding against violations of 
parliamentary intention or principles of embedded in the common law.  The HRA was enacted 
for a different purpose, namely “to give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under 
the” ECHR as amplified in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.  
 The two streams of law are not, however, watertight categories. Many claimants rely 
on both domestic law and HRA grounds of review.  Recent research shows that Convention 
rights are used in about half of all judicial review claims, though most often “to supplement 
established grounds for judicial review in cases that would have been pursued in any event on 
such grounds prior to the introduction of the HRA”.9  
 Moreover, judicial techniques and legal concepts for reviewing the substance of 
governmental decisions developed in one stream feed into the other. Such “leakage” may in 
some situations be appropriate, but it may also lead to problems — as it clearly has when 
courts attempted to use irrationality as a basis for dealing with claims under s.6 of the HRA.  
Table 1 sets out the fate of the unreasonableness review in handling Convention rights. 
Irrationality review has limited utility in this context.   
 
Table 1: the fate of irrationality in Convention right contexts 
Art. 2 Art. 3 (at least in 
immigration and 
asylum) 
Art.5(4) (at least in 
mental health cases) 
Arts 8 – 11 
The CA is close to 
accepting that 
irrationality review 
must be so intense 
that it is in effect 
merits review (+ 
some deference) 
Irrationality review 
does provide an 
effective remedy, but 
there must be anxious 
scrutiny. 
Irrationality review is 
not an effective 
remedy as it excludes 
adequate examination 
of merits 
Irrationality no 
longer appropriate; 
instead use 
proportionality +  
deference 
R. (Bloggs 61) v 
SSHD [2003] EWCA 
Civ 686 
R. v. SSHD Ex p 
Thangarasa [2002] 
UKHL 36 
HL v United 
Kingdom, 5th 
October 2004 
R v SSHD Ex p Daly 
[2001] UKHL 26 
 
 
In relation to ECHR Art.2, in R (Bloggs 61) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
which involved an Art.2 claim, the Court of Appeal came close to accepting that the where 
                                                 
 
8
 See further Mark Elliott, “The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Standard of Substantive Review” (2001) 60 
C.L.J. 301 (written before leading cases such as Daly and Alconbury). 
9
 Public Law Project/Varda Bondy, The Impact of the Human Rights Act on Judicial Review: An Empirical 
Research Study (June 2003), p.31. 
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the right to life is in issue (“the most fundamental of human rights”) irrationality scrutiny may 
become so intense that it implodes into something almost indistinguishable from merits 
review, with the court becoming the primary decision-maker.10 The case concerned the 
removal of a prisoner from a “protected witness unit” into a mainstream prison and whether 
this would breach Art.2.  Auld L.J. commented that  
For what it is worth, I do not share the uncertainty of Ouseley J. [at first instance] as to 
how the court should decide the matter if the law had developed to the stage where it 
could make a decision on the merits for itself. I would have reached the same 
conclusion as the Prison Service, for the reasons it gave. 
 
Keene L.J, agreeing, said: 
… I agree, and would only wish to emphasise one aspect of the Article 2 issue. The 
right of life under that Article is an unqualified right and one which is self-evidently 
fundamental in nature. The issue is not, therefore, one of whether interference with the 
right can be justified on grounds of competing public considerations but simply 
whether it has been shown that there is or would be an interference with the right as a 
result of the decision of the Prison Service. In that sense it is very different from those 
cases where the courts are considering a claim that the public body has not struck the 
right balance between the individual’s rights and the public interest, such as may arise 
where, for example, it is the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 
that is engaged.  
 I can see that in these circumstances it could be argued that it is for the court to 
make its own judgment as to whether there would be an interference with the right to 
life under Article 2, rather than making a judgment as to the reasonableness of the 
decision made by the Prison Service. The court is a public authority by virtue of 
section 6(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998 and cannot therefore act in a way which is 
incompatible with a Convention right. There is no direct authority in English law as 
yet on this issue, and it is to be observed that in the Pro-life case the House of Lords 
was dealing with an Article 10 case, where a balance was to be struck between the 
right to freedom of expression and the factors set out in Article 10(2). It was therefore 
not an unconditional right case. … 
 Even were it to be the case that it is for the court to make that primary 
judgment, the reality is that the court would have to attach considerable weight to the 
assessment of risk made by those with professional involvement in the areas with 
which the case was concerned, which in the present case means the police and the 
Prison Service. 
 
In relation to ECHR Art.3 (torture, inhuman or degrading treatment), the “anxious scrutiny” 
variant of irrationality is, however, recognised by the English courts11 and the Strasbourg 
court12 as providing an effective remedy for the purposes of Art.13 in the context of 
immigration and asylum decisions. The Administrative Court is expected to arrive at its own 
conclusions on the facts, or at least examine the underlying facts rigorously to see if they 
compel a different conclusion to one reached by the decision-maker.13 Some margin of 
                                                 
 
10
 [2003] EWCA Civ 686; [2003] 1 W.L.R. 2724. 
11
 R. (Thangarasa) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKHL 36. 
12
 Vilvarajah v UK [1991] EHRR 248. 
13
 R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Turgut [2000] U.K.H.R.R. 403. 
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discretion may be allowed to the decision-maker.14  
 ECHR Art.5(2) guarantees “Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or 
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall 
be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful”. In 
October 2004, the Strasbourg Court in HL v United Kingdom held that “super-Wednesbury”15 
did not constitute an effective remedy for the purposes of Art.5(4) in a case where a person 
was “informally” detained without his consent in a mental hospital.16  The deficiency is that 
irrationality review excludes adequate examination of the merits of the claimant’s case – here 
“the merits of the clinical views as to the persistence of mental illness justifying detention”.  
 The domestic courts’ approach in cases involving ECHR Arts 3 and 5 where a 
person’s detention and treatment is dependent on clinical judgement has been rather different. 
In October 2001, the CA in R (Wilkinson) v Broadmoor Special Hospital seemed to indicate 
that a merits review approach was required, with the court reaching its own view of the need 
for medical treatment on the basis of oral evidence from medical witnesses including cross-
examination. 17  Subsequent cases have sought to distinguish Wilkinson and emphasise that 
the court’s role is one of supervisory not merits review. In other words, the court must avoid 
substituting its own discretion for that of the impugned public authority, albeit that in carrying 
out “the most anxious scrutiny”, and “rigorously examining all the evidence”, the court may 
have to form a view of its own on some matters of fact.18 
 In cases where a court is called upon to adjudicate on alleged failures to balance the 
considerations that must be taken into account in relation to the qualified Convention rights 
(principally ECHR Arts 8 – 11), and the question of what “is necessary in a democratic 
society”. Here use of Wednesbury, even with anxious scrutiny, has been held not to provide 
an effective remedy; instead a proportionality test is to be used. This follows from Smith and 
Grady v United Kingdom in which the Strasbourg Court held that even intensive irrationality 
review was inadequate for the purposes of protecting rights under Art.8.19  The test did not 
allow the court adequately to assess whether the prohibition on gay men and women serving 
in the armed forces could be justified on the basis of social need, national security or public 
order. Initially, in Mahmood,20 the Court of Appeal may have fail to see the full implications 
of the Strasbourg decisions in Smith and Lustig-Prean, but the position was “clarified” by the 
House of Lords in Daly.21  
 
 
                                                 
 
14
 See the exchange of views in Public Law: I. Leigh, “Taking Rights Proportionately: Judicial Review, the 
Human Rights Act and Strasbourg” [2002] P.L. 265 and S. Atrill, “Keeping the Executive in the Picture” [2003] 
P.L. 41.  
15
 See below. 
16
 Application 45508/99 (5 October 2004), arising from Re L [1999] 1 A.C. 458 (HL), [1998] 2 W.L.R. 764 
(CA).  
17
 [2001] EWCA Civ 1545; [2002] 1 W.L.R. 419. 
18
 See e.g.  R (IR) v Shetty [2003] EWHC 3022, Munby J (whether the claimant suffering severe psychotic 
episodes could lawfully be transferred to prison from a psychiatric clinic); Claire F v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2004] EWHC 111, Munby J (whether lawful for a baby to be separated from her mother who 
was serving a long sentence of imprisonment – it was not the court’s function to come to its own assessment of 
what is in the child’s best interests). 
19Smith v UK [1999] I.R.L.R. 734 and Lustig-Prean v UK (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 548. 
20
 R (Mahmood) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 W.L.R. 840, CA. 
21
 R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Daly [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 A.C. 532. 
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3. Irrationality in domestic contexts 
 
In the rest of this paper, I focus on the operation of unreasonableness review in domestic 
contexts (i.e., where Convention rights do not feature or at least are not at the forefront of the 
claimant’s case).  At the outset, however, it must be acknowledged that Convention rights 
may exert an influence here (even leaving aside the speculative question, whether in time 
proportionality will come to be the main judicial tool in domestic law as well as qualified 
Convention right situations).  
 
Using Convention rights to get anxious scrutiny 
 
First, claimants may argue that a Convention right is engaged, though hold back from 
deploying a fully fledged argument based on breach of the Convention right in question, in 
order to benefit from the “anxious scrutiny” approach to Wednesbury that had been 
established several years before the HRA in relation to “fundamental rights”.22  A good 
illustration is R. v (Anne) v Test Valley BC where the husband and wife claimants said that 
their rights under ECHR Arts 2 and 8, along with Art.1 of the First Protocol were affected.23  
The claimants argued that the council had unlawfully refused permission to fell a large lime 
tree in a neighbour’s garden, spores from which, the claimants said, were seriously harming 
the wife’s health and the thatched roof of their cottage. Forbes J. noted that counsel for the 
claimants 
has expressly confined his submissions and the case to the challenge on rationality 
grounds and has argued that, since the relevant complaint was one which did concern 
matters involving the various Convention rights to which I have referred earlier in this 
judgment, the court should give “anxious scrutiny” to the decision-making process in 
question, when considering whether the conclusions reached are susceptible to 
challenge on grounds of rationality. In the circumstances of this case, I am content to 
approach the matter on that basis. It is, therefore, unnecessary for me to express any 
concluded view as to whether that is necessarily the correct approach. 
 
Forbes J. went on to look at the evidence in considerable detail, holding that the council had 
not acted irrationally. This approach has the potential to increase the frequency with which 
courts engage in “anxious scrutiny” Wednesbury review. I return to the general issue below. 
 
Courts of “full jurisdiction” 
 
A second Convention right influence on Wednesbury review of domestic law duties and rights 
comes from Art.6(1). This guarantees that “In the determination of his civil rights and 
obligations …., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing … by an independent and 
impartial tribunal”.  Some — but not all — claims for judicial review involve “civil rights and 
obligations”. Whether a claim does or not may be “a very difficult question”.24 In Alconbury, 
Lord Clyde accepted that25 
                                                 
 
22
 See below. 
23
 [2001] EWHC Admin 1019, [2002] Env.L.R. 22. 
24
 R (Begum) v Tower Hamlets LBC [2003] UKHL 5; [2003] 2 A.C. 430 at [82] (Lord Millett). 
25
 R. v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions Ex p. Holdings & Barnes Plc 
(“Alconbury”) [2001] UKHL 23; [2003] 2 A.C. 295 at [150]. 
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It is thus clear that article 6(1) is engaged where the decision which is to be given is of 
an administrative character, that is to say one given in an exercise of a discretionary 
power, as well as a dispute in a court of law regarding the private rights of the citizen, 
provided that it directly affects civil rights and obligations and is of a genuine and 
serious nature. 
 
Disputes with the Inland Revenue over tax affairs do not, according to the Strasbourg court,26 
though Lord Walker doubts whether this is correct (and so do I).27  In the town and country 
planning context, development plan policies are not “directly decisive” of a claimant’s rights, 
and so fall outside the protective ambit of Art.6(1).28 In cases involving a possession orders 
sought by a local authority, the position is far from clear (as the House of Lords 
acknowledged in February 2003).29  
 The whole relationship between “civil rights and obligations” and claims for judicial 
review is clearly one to which the English courts must return.30  There are many square pegs 
and round holes here. Problems arise because Art.6(1) was not designed to deal with claims 
relating to the legality of public authority administrative decisions; it “was intended to be 
supplemented by further measures in relation to the making of administrative decisions”,31 but 
these have not been forthcoming from the Council of Europe. Furthermore, the concept of 
“civil rights and obligations”, while perhaps making sense in civilian legal systems, sits 
uneasily with the basic categories of a common law system.    
 This is not the place to examine Art.6(1) in detail. The main point for present purposes 
is to note that if Art.6(1) is engaged, then a claimant is entitled to a court of “full jurisdiction” 
and “judicial control” over the legality of the disputed decision. This does not necessarily 
require a complete rehearing on the merits. As Lord Hoffmann put it in Alconbury, what is 
needed is “jurisdiction to deal with the case as the nature of the decision requires”.32 
 The Administrative Court, using Wednesbury review, may in some contexts be 
expected to consider questions of fact more closely than it otherwise would have done.  The 
CA in McLellan (where possession was sought by the council against a claimant who had an 
“introductory tenancy”) held:33 
Where facts can be established with certainty, for example rent arrears, the question as 
to the reasonableness of a decision to terminate an introductory tenancy will be 
suitable for determination on judicial review. However, if the council in providing 
reasons alleges acts that are disputed, then that may raise issues of fact. … The right 
question under the scheme will be whether in the context of allegation and counter-
                                                 
 
26
 Ferrazzini v Italy (2002) 34 EHRR 45 held the concept of “civil rights and obligations” under Art. 6(1) did not 
extend to cover disputes between citizens and public authorities as to the lawfulness under domestic law of tax 
authorities’ decisions as “tax matters still formed part of the hard core of public-authority prerogatives, with the 
public nature of the relationship between the tax payer and the tax authority remaining predominant”.  See also 
A. Le Sueur, “Appeals and Judicial Review after the Human Rights (Jersey) Law 2000” [2002] Jersey Law 
Review 142. 
27
 R (Begum) v Tower Hamlets LBC [2003] UKHL 5; [2003] 2 A.C. 430. 
28
 R. (Aggregate Industries UK Ltd) v English Nature [2002] EWHC 908 Admin; [2002] A.C.D. 67 (p. 403). 
29
 R (Begum) v Tower Hamlets LBC [2003] UKHL 5; [2003] 2 A.C. 430. 
30
 For a general discussion, see J. Herberg, A. Le Sueur and J. Mulcahy, “Determining Civil Rights and 
Obligations” in J. Jowell and J. Cooper, eds., Understanding Human Rights Principles (Hart Publishing, 2001). 
31
 See R. (Begum) v Tower Hamlets LBC [2003] UKHL 5; [2003] 2 A.C. 430 at [28] and [86]. 
32
 Alconbury at [87]. 
33
 R. (McLennan) v Bracknell Forest BC [2001] EWCA Civ 1510, [2002] A.C.D.54 (p.332), [H41]. 
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allegation it was reasonable for the council to take a decision to proceed with 
termination of the introductory tenancy. That again is a matter which can be dealt with 
under judicial review either of the traditional kind or if it is necessary to do so 
intensified so as to ensure that the tenant’s rights are protected. 
 
In the later HL case of  Begum, the issue was different: the council’s obligation under the 
Housing Act 1996 where a homeless person refuses a secure tenancy offered by the council 
under its duty to homeless people, on the ground that the accommodation offered was 
unsuitable. The claimant said that the decision reached by the council’s reviewing officer, 
following an internal procedure, was irrational. Lord Hoffmann, with whom the other 
members of the Appellate Committee agreed, said:34 
[47] Although I do not think that the exercise of administrative functions requires a 
mechanism for independent findings of fact or a full appeal, it does need to be lawful 
and fair. … In any case, the gap between judicial review and a full right of appeal is 
seldom in practice very wide. Even with a full right of appeal it is not easy for an 
appellate tribunal which has not itself seen the witnesses to differ from the decision-
maker on questions of primary fact and, more especially relevant to this case, on 
questions of credibility…. [49] No doubt it is open to a court exercising the review 
jurisdiction [conferred on county courts, but the same in scope as CPR 54] to adopt a 
more intensive scrutiny of the rationality of the reviewing officer’s conclusions of fact 
but this is not the occasion to enter into the question of when it should do so. When 
one is dealing with a welfare scheme which, in the particular case does not engage 
human rights (does not, for example, require consideration of Art.8) then the intensity 
of review must depend upon what one considers to be the most consistent with the 
statutory scheme. …[50] All that we are concerned with in this appeal is the 
requirements of Art.6, which I do not think mandates a more intensive approach to 
judicial review of questions of fact.  These nuances are well within the margin of 
appreciation which the Convention allows to contracting states and which, in a case 
like this, the courts should concede to Parliament. So I do not propose to say anything 
about whether a review of fact going beyond conventional principles of judicial 
review would be either permissible or appropriate. It seems to me sufficient to say that 
in the case of the normal Part VII [of the Housing Act 1996] decision, engaging no 
human rights other that Art.6, conventional judicial review such as the Strasbourg 
court considered in the Bryan case (1995) 21 E.H.R.R. 342 is sufficient. 
                                                 
 
34
 R (Begum) v Tower Hamlets LBC [2003] UKHL 5; [2003] 2 A.C. 430 
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4. The development of  “anxious scrutiny” 
 
Clearly, in predominantly domestic law situations, the effectiveness of unreasonableness 
argument will be linked to the intensity with which the court in evaluates the facts, reasoning 
and conclusions of the public authority.  There are today four many categories controlling 
intensity of review. 
 
Table 2: intensity of review 
Type of review Test 
Non-justiciable For a recent case, see e.g. R. (on the application of Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament) v Prime Minister [2002] EWHC 2777; [2003] A.C.D. 36. 
super-
Wednesbury 
“so absurd that the decision-maker must have taken leave of his senses” 
(Nottinghamshire CC [1986] AC 240) 
“The greater the policy content of a decision, and the more remote the 
subject matter of a decision from ordinary judicial experience, the more 
hesitant the court must necessarily be in holding a decision to be 
irrational. That is good law and, like most good law, common sense. 
Where decisions of a policy-laden, esoteric or security-based nature are in 
issue, even greater caution than normal must be shown in applying the 
test, but the test itself is sufficiently flexible to cover all situations” 
(Bingham in Smith) 
basic 
Wednesbury 
“… a decision that elicits the exclamation ‘my goodness, that is certainly 
wrong!’” R. v Devon CC ex p. George [1989] A.C. 573 
“so outrageous in its defiance of  logic or of accepted moral standards that 
no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided 
could have arrived at it” (CCSU v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 
AC 374 at 410 per Lord Diplock) 
“anxious 
scrutiny”, 
 
“enhanced level 
scrutiny”, 
 
“rigorous 
examination” 
“Reasonableness in such cases is not, however, synonymous with 
‘absurdity’ or ‘perversity’. Review is stricter and the courts ask the 
question posed by the majority in Brind, namely, ‘whether a reasonable 
Secretary of State, on the material before him, could reasonably conclude 
that the interference with freedom of expression was justifiable’. This test 
lowers the threshold of unreasonableness. In addition, it has been held that 
decisions infringing rights should receive the ‘most anxious scrutiny’ of 
the courts.” de Smith, Woolf and Jowell, Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action 5th Edition at para 13-060, approved by Roch L.J. 
in R. v. Saville Inquiry Ex p. A and others [1999] EWHC Admin 556,  
 
Can the decision ‘confidently enough said to have been correct’? (Gurung 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 654, 
Buxton L.J.). 
The court may not interfere with the exercise of an administrative decision 
on substantive grounds save where the court is satisfied ... that it is beyond 
the range of responses open to a reasonable decision-maker but in judging 
whether the decision-maker has exceeded this margin of appreciation the 
human rights context is important. The more substantial the interference 
with human rights, the more the court will require by way of justification 
before it is satisfied that the decision is reasonable in the sense outlined 
above. (R. v Ministry of Defence Ex p Smith, per Sir Thomas Bingham) 
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When the variable intensity approach to unreasonableness was first propounded by Lord 
Bridge in R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Bugdaycay,35 it is likely that 
this variant on the orthodox approach would be used in comparatively rare situations. In that 
case “human life or liberty was at risk”. Prior to the HRA, one had to find a “fundamental 
right” recognised by the common law, or perhaps recognised as a norm of international law, 
in order to kick start an anxious scrutiny argument. Today, surely almost all such common 
law rights have broadly corresponding Convention rights and these dominate our thinking 
about fundamental rights. While unreasonableness continues to be used for claims made on 
Arts 2 and 3 (see above), and while the judicial review case load remains dominated by 
immigration and asylum matters, the nominated judges will spend a considerable proportion 
of their time using the anxious scrutiny approach. It is no longer a test held in reserve for 
unusual situations. It may not be too much of an exaggeration to say that there is now as much 
anxious scrutiny as there is orthodox unreasonableness adjudication in the Administrative 
Court, certainly if one puts applications for permission into the equation. 
 The attempt at fine tuning, set out in Table 2, creates a number of conceptual 
challenges and problems. 
 First, should the varying degrees of intensity be regarded as categories, or is  it better 
to view them as points along a spectrum? In Mahmood, Laws L.J. was clear that there is a 
spectrum. Referring to the Smith formula, he said:36 
that approach and the basic Wednesbury rule are by no means hermetically sealed the 
one from the other. There is, rather, what may be called a sliding scale of review; the 
graver the impact of the decision in question upon the individual affected by it, the 
more substantial the justification that will be required. 
 
Of course, we all know that in judicial review “context is everything”. I have some doubts, 
however, whether a sliding scale approach is the best one. Arguably, recognising categories 
may make it easier for there to be a principled and more certain approach to the court’s role: if 
situation A then intensity B, rather than slithering around in grey areas. 
 Secondly, there is a problem of deciding into which category, or where on the sliding 
scale, a case sits. This is often obvious, but is sometimes contested. In Smith, the counsel for 
the gay servicemen and women contended for anxious scrutiny, while the Ministry of Defence 
argued for a super-Wednesbury test to be applied; the former prevailed because the policy was 
not one that “depends essentially on political judgment” and, distinguishing the 
Nottinghamshire case, the human rights dimension was “prominent”.37  More recently in 
Javed, the challenge was to delegated legislation designating Pakistan, for the purposes of 
returning asylum seekers, as a country in which there was “in general no serious risk of 
persecution”. The Order had been subject to short debates in both the Commons and the 
Lords. For the Secretary of State it was contended that super-Wednesbury was the appropriate 
intensity of review: the matter related to policy considerations affecting the UK’s foreign 
relations; moreover, a more intensive approach would be inconsistent with article 9 of the Bill 
of Rights 1689. The claimants argued for anxious scrutiny. The CA plumped for ordinary 
                                                 
 
35
 [1987] AC 514. 
36
 Mahmood, above, at [19]. 
37
 [1995] 4 All ER 427  per Simon Brown L.J. Div. Ct. Curtis J. held that ordinary Wednesbury should govern 
the situation; in the CA all were agreed that the anxious scrutiny approach applied. 
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Wednesbury (and went on to hold the legislation unreasonable).  In the Medway case,38 
Maurice Kay J. stated, having held that it was unreasonable to exclude Gatwick from the 
options offered for consultation over expansion of airport capacity: 
I make it clear that, although I have in mind the importance of the future development 
of air transport and my duty to detach myself from the ultimate policy merits, I do not 
accept [the] submission that the questions raised by this case are matters of such high 
policy that the are challengeable only the basis of bad faith (which is not alleged) …. I 
consider them to be reviewable on traditional judicial review grounds although I 
accept that it behoves me to approach them with particular care. 
 
In Begum, discussed above, Lord Bingham warned:39 
I can see no warrant for applying in this context notions of “anxious scrutiny” …  or 
the enhanced approach to judicial review described by Lord Steyn in R (Daly) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 AC 532, 546-548. I would also 
demur at the suggestion of Laws LJ in the Court of Appeal in the present case ([2002] 
EWCA Civ 239, [44]) that the judge may subject the decision to “a close and rigorous 
analysis” if by that is meant an analysis closer or more rigorous that would ordinarily 
and properly be conducted by a careful and competent judge determining an 
application for judicial review. 
 
There is, then, considerable scope for judicial disagreement and, as yet, perhaps insufficiently 
developed principles to guide the choice. 
 Thirdly, there is the question of what anxious scrutiny actually requires the court to 
do. It is a “mantra” so frequently invoked by counsel and the courts that there is a risk of 
forgetting, or never discovering, what it entails — or else end up paying only lip service to 
it.40 The following principles can be extracted from the case law. 
• A “common sense” approach is to be taken: anxious scrutiny “does not mean that the 
court should strive by tortuous mental gymnastics to find error in the decision under 
review when in truth there has been none”.41  
• “The concern of the court ought to be substance not semantics”. Nor is it appropriate 
to focus “on particular sentences” in a decision-maker’s determination “and to 
subject them to the kind of legalistic scrutiny that might perhaps be appropriate in 
the case of a statutory instrument, charter party or trust deed”.42 But while it would 
be wrong to interpret the decision of a decision maker “in a minute textual fashion, 
… it must be right in every case to see whether substantial and proper reasons are 
given”.43 
• The court’s role remains one of review for error of law.44 
                                                 
 
38
 R. (Medway Council and others) v Secretary of State for Transport [2002] EWHC 2516 Admin; [2003] J.P.L. 
583 at [18] 
39
 R (Begum) v Tower Hamlets LBC [2003] UKHL 5; [2003] 2 A.C. 430. 
40
 R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Sivakumar (FC)  [2001] EWCA Civ 1196,[2002] 
I.N.L.R. 310 (and an appeal to the HL, see [2003] UKHL 14). 
41
 R. (Sarkisian) v IAT [2001] EWHC Admin 486, Mumby J. 
42
 R (Puspalatha) v IAT [2001] EWHC Admin 333 at [43], Sullivan J. 
43
 R. (Kurecaj and another) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWHC 1199 Admin, Gibbs J.   
44
 R (Puga) v IAT [2001] EWCA Civ 931, Laws L.J.: “[31] As is well known, in 1987 Lord Bridge said in the 
case of Musisi [1987] 1 AC 514 that these cases need to be approached with anxious scrutiny, given what may be 
involved. And so they must. But as a reading of his Lordship’s speech in that case readily demonstrates, the 
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• The burden of argument shifts from the claimant to the defendant public authority. 
The claimant no longer has to demonstrate unreasonableness, but rather the 
defendant needs to produce a justification for the decision that satisfies the court 
that it was properly made (with the court according the public authority appropriate 
“deference”).  
• The court is not a fact-finder (though it may have regard to factual material not 
before the primary decision-maker).45 
• The Court will be less inclined to accept ex post facto justifications from the public 
authority, compared to ordinary reasonableness.46 
 
The challenge is to achieve enhanced review without (a) turning the exercise into an appeal on 
the merits of the decision or (b) slipping into an approach based on proportionality rather than 
reasonableness.  
 
Table 3: Types of judicial control 
Type of judicial control Main features 
“Anxious” or 
“enhanced”  
irrationality review 
 The issue remains whether the public authority’s 
decision is within a reasonable range of options. 
 
Proportionality review 
—whether: (i) the objective is 
sufficiently important to 
justify limiting a fundamental 
right; (ii) the measures 
designed to meet the 
objective are rationally 
connected to it; and (iii) the 
means used to impair the 
right or freedom are no more 
than is necessary to 
accomplish the objective.47 
* Court itself may need to assess the balance public 
authority has struck between competing interests, not 
merely consider whether that balance is reasonable. 
 
* Court may have regard to the relative weight of the 
various considerations taken into account. 
Merits review/appeal Court becomes the primary fact finder and decision-
maker 
 
Fourthly, there is the problem of mismatch between the category the court fits at case into and 
the approach it actually takes. In Smith, Simon Brown L.J. at first instance, having held that 
an anxious scrutiny approach was appropriate, nevertheless went on to use language that reads 
(and had the effect) much like ordinary irrationality review:48 
Only if it were plain beyond sensible argument that no conceivable damage could be 
done to the armed services as a fighting unit would it be appropriate for this court now 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
court’s role remains one of review for error of law. There is no error of law here.” 
45
 Polat v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] All ER (D) 254 (Jul). 
46
 R (Leung) v Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine [2002] EWHC 1358 Admin, [2002] ELR 
653) 
47
 See de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture [1999] 1 A.C. 69, approved by Lord Steyn in 
Daly, above. 
48
 [1995] 4 All ER 427, Div. Ct. 
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to remove the issue entirely from the hands both of the military and of the 
government. … With all these considerations in mind, I have come finally to the 
conclusion that, my own view of the evidence notwithstanding, the minister’s stance 
cannot properly be held unlawful. His suggested justification for the ban may to many 
seem unconvincing; to say, however, that it is outrageous in its defiance of logic is 
another thing. There is, I conclude, still room for two views. Similarly it is difficult to 
regard the policy as wholly incompatible with ‘accepted moral standards’. 
 
A case that is arguably in the other direction is Medway.49 Maurice Kay J. explicitly applied 
ordinary Wednesbury, but it strikes me that was required by the court from the Secretary of 
State was something akin to the intensity found in the anxious/enhanced scrutiny cases. 
 
5. The every day use of unreasonableness 
 
So for this paper has focused on a relatively small number of well-known cases to sketch out 
the modern architecture for unreasonableness arguments. I want now to move on to see what 
is happening “on the ground” in domestic cases; I do this by looking at a sample of 41 judicial 
review cases decided between January 2000 and July 2003 (set out in the Appendix, below). 
Cases involving unreasonableness arguments in relation to Convention rights have been 
excluded. In most cases, a ground of review based on irrationality is added as a final 
supplement to others arguments, rather than being the main basis of challenge. In selecting the 
cases I have however attempted to disentangle unreasonableness points from others.  
 Unreasonableness arguments in the sample cases had a reasonably high success rate: 
claimants succeeded on this ground in 18 cases and failed in 23.  The sample may perhaps be 
unrepresentative in several respects, including because the law report editors are more likely 
to select cases in which this argument is successful. Nevertheless, given what is often 
described as the high “threshold” of the unreasonableness test, is it not surprising that 
claimants seem to succeed in a relatively large proportion of cases? 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
For the reasons I have set out above, I believe that unreasonableness is struggling to survive 
as a coherent and useful ground of review.  Its days are surely numbered as a tool for dealing 
with Convention rights claims: proportionality or merits review look set to step in (according 
to the nature of the Convention right engaged).  Even in relation to domestic law judicial 
review, too much seems to be required of the unreasonableness ground. Without developing a 
particularly robust set of principles to guide it, the apparatus for variable intensity — supra-
Wednesbury, ordinary Wednesbury, anxious scrutiny — seems less than clear in practice. 
 In considering the medium term future of Wednesbury unreasonableness in relation to 
domestic law judicial review claims, one can envisage several possibilities. First, the law, 
having developed in sophistication, may remain broadly static over the next 15 years or so. 
The courts may be content to let the last big innovation — variable intensity review — bed 
down.   Secondly, the common law on rationality review may continue to evolve. As I have 
suggested, the approach to anxious scrutiny would benefit from further conceptual 
                                                 
 
49
 R. (Medway Council and others) v Secretary of State for Transport [2002] EWHC 2516 Admin; [2003] J.P.L. 
583 at [18] 
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clarification. Thirdly, the whole concept of irrationality as a basis of review in domestic law 
judicial review may be abandoned by the courts in favour of a proportionality test similar to 
that used in relation to qualified Convention right cases.  Fourthly, if central government 
remains concerned about the unpredictability of irrationality review, there is always the 
possibility that legislation may be introduced to restrict the use of unreasonableness as a 
ground of judicial review in relation to some decision-making schemes, to the extent 
permitted by Convention rights.50  
 
APPENDIX: Sample of Wednesbury unreasonableness/irrationality  
cases January 2000-July 2003 
 
This survey has been compiled using the Current Legal Information CD-Rom searching for the words 
“irrational”, “irrationality”, “rational”, “unreasonable” and “Wednesbury”.  The summaries are based closely on 
those provide by CLI. 
 
UNREASONABLENESS FOUND: 
 
Bosworth Beverages Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners [2001] V. & D.R. 491.  Held: unreasonable. 
Customs were entitled to prohibit any sales that would involve removal of the goods from a bonded warehouse 
but Reg.17(3) of the Excise Warehousing (etc) Regulations 1988  did not give Customs the authority to prohibit 
in warehouse transfers of goods because there was no threat to the revenue if the goods did not leave the 
warehouse. The second part of the direction merely required the giving of notice to Customs prior to a transfer 
out of B’s account. It did not prohibit a transfer in bond to M within the warehouse. The Commissioners acted 
ultra vires in purporting to exercise such a power. It was for the bonded warehouse to ensure that excise duty 
payable on removal was paid and the Commissioners had acted Wednesbury unreasonably in failing to take this 
into account in restricting transfers within the warehouse. 
 
R. (on the application of F) v Special Adjudicator [2002] EWHC 777; [2002] Imm. A.R. 407. Held: 
unreasonable. F sought judicial review of the special adjudicator’s refusal to adjourn the hearing of her asylum 
appeal and his dismissal of her appeal against the Secretary of State’s certification of her claim. F was a citizen 
of Kosovo, raped by three Serbian soldiers leaving her psychiatrically injured. Her application for asylum had 
been refused. At the hearing before the special adjudicator she sought an adjournment to obtain a report from a 
psychiatrist, which was to be available within a few days and preliminary indications of which were favourable 
to F. The special adjudicator refused the adjournment and stated that he would not take such a report into 
account even if it were sent to him after the hearing.  The special adjudicator’s decisions were quashed and the 
certificate was set aside. It was Wednesbury unreasonable to refuse the adjournment or later consideration as the 
delay was slight and on the facts acceptable. The refusal of the adjournment inevitably prevented F from 
presenting relevant and potentially cogent evidence in favour of her appeal. 
 
R. (on the application of M) v Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2002] EWHC 2646; (2003) 100(2) 
L.S.G. 31. H applied for judicial review of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority’s failure to determine 
his claim within a reasonable time. H, an infant proceeding by his adoptive mother, had applied to CICA for 
compensation in relation to severe brain injuries suffered as a result of his being shaken by one of his natural 
parents. Held: the failure of CICA to determine H’s claim expeditiously was Wednesbury unreasonable. 
 
R. (on the application of H) v Ashworth Hospital Authority [2002] EWCA Civ 923; [2003] 1 W.L.R. 127. Held: 
the Mental Health Review Tribunal had acted unreasonably in failing to consider the availability of suitable after 
care and accommodation when deciding to order H’s immediate discharge. Where a tribunal had doubts as to 
whether such services would be available on discharge, it should adjourn so as to obtain the necessary 
                                                 
 
50
 cf. in Australia, the Migration Act 1958, s.476(2), upheld by the High Court of Australia in Abebe v The 
Commonwealth (1999) 162 A.L.R. 1 and in the UK the proposed ouster clause in the Immigration and Asylum 
(Treatment of Claimants etc) Bill 2004, on which see A Le Sueur, “Three strikes and it’s out? The UK 
government’s strategy to oust judicial review from immigration and asylum decision-making” [2004] PL 225. 
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information. 
 
R. (on the application of National Association of Colliery Overmen Deputies and Shotfirers) v Secretary of State 
for Work and Pensions [2003] EWHC 607. N sought judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision not to 
immediately modify and revise the guidance given in the Notes on the Diagnosis of Prescribed Diseases, NDPD, 
on the use of the Cold Water Provocation Test as a diagnostic tool for vibration induced white finger in claims 
for industrial injuries benefits under the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 s.108.  Held, the 
decision was irrational. the court declined to pronounce on whether the cold water provocation test had become 
obsolete. However, no medical evidence existed to support the test as a useful diagnostic tool; (2) The Secretary 
of State had intended MAs to only treat the test as an opportunity for the claimant to demonstrate the existence 
of white finger. However, without clear guidance, MAs and decision makers might continue to be influenced by 
the results of the test, and (3) the decision not to amend the existing NDPD was founded upon a failure to take 
account of material consideration, namely that, on proper analysis, the evidence established that MAs appeared 
to have placed reliance on the test as a negative diagnostic tool. Although the NDPD did not state that the test 
was a diagnostic tool, in the absence of additional guidance there was a danger that it might be construed as 
indicating that a negative result could provide evidence that vibration induced white finger was not present. The 
NDPD should have been modified so as to clearly stipulate that the test should be treated as having no diagnostic 
value 
 
R. (on the application of Cream) v General Medical Council  [2002] EWHC 436; [2002] Lloyd’s Rep. Med. 292.  
C,  a consultant dermatologist, applied for judicial review of the decision of the Professional Conduct Committee 
that he had been guilty of serious professional misconduct when he passed information to an appointments 
committee concerning the conduct of a colleague which subsequently proved to be false. C argued that the 
decision was irrational or one which no reasonable committee would have reached.  Held: the GMC had acted 
irrationally. Under the GMC’s good practice statement, Good Practice Guide 1998 it was not incumbent on a 
doctor to take any steps to inform himself further as to the facts until he had decided to take action. Even on a 
straightforward and uncomplicated understanding of the statement, it would be absurd for a doctor who had 
received unspecific rumour to investigate either its provenance or truth. 
 
R. (on the application of Kelsall) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2003] 
EWHC 459.  K, a former mink farmer, sought judicial review of the Fur Farming (Compensation Scheme) 
(England) Order 2002, which provided a scheme for compensating farmers for business lost as a result of the 
implementation of the Fur Farming (Prohibition) Act 2000. K contended that the provisions of the scheme were 
unfair, irrational and discriminatory in so far as they (1) failed to compensate for the value of breeding males; (2) 
failed to recognise special breeds, and (3) reduced compensation according to the date of cessation of business. 
Held: the decision to pay no compensation in respect of breeding males was irrational given the fact that the 
income arising from the breeding of mink necessarily required male as well as female mink and the fact that 
breeding males were worth more than breeding females … 
 
R. (on the application of Medway Council) v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the 
Regions [2002] EWHC 2516; [2003] J.P.L. 583.  Held: the decision was irrational in that one of the reasons for 
the exclusion was that Gatwick could not be made a hub airport within the appropriate time frame when the 
consultation document made it clear that there was no decision to promote a hub airport. Furthermore, it was 
premature to exclude the Gatwick option at this stage since the aim of the consultation period was to refine 
various assumptions. It was procedurally unfair to operate the consultation process in such a way so as to 
effectively prevent the applicants from advocating Gatwick as an alternative solution at a later stage in the 
decision making process. The decision was also irrational in view of the conservation and environmental 
importance of the proposed alternative site in Kent and the obligation imposed by the Conservation (Natural 
Habitats &c) Regulations 1994 Reg.48 and Reg.49 on the planning authority to consider any reasonable 
alternatives which would include Gatwick. 
 
R. (on the application of Gurung) v Ministry of Defence [2003] EWHC 2463; (2003) 100 L.S.G. 25. G and other 
Nepalese nationals sought judicial review of the decision of the MoD to exclude them from the scheme awarding 
ex gratia compensation to former prisoners of war of the Japanese. G had been recruited in Nepal for service in 
the Indian army under the auspices of the British Government and, before being captured, had served in a 
Gurkha rifle brigade. In 1955 the Gurkhas were excluded from compensation arrangements made in 1951 on the 
ground that they were paid and treated like any other sepoy, namely according to the colonial Indian military 
law. G argued, inter alia, that his exclusion from the scheme amounted to an irrational departure from common 
law principles relating to equality of treatment.  Held: the Gurkhas’ allocation to the colonial military law in 
1955 had been based on their race and the continued reliance on that argument undermined the rationality of 
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their exclusion from the scheme. The exclusion of Nepalese nationals from the scheme was irrational and 
inconsistent with the principle of equality that formed the cornerstone of United Kingdom law. 
 
R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Javed [2001] EWCA Civ 789; [2002] Q.B. 129.  
Inclusion of Pakistan on ‘white list’ under Asylum (Designated Countries of Destination and Designated Safe 
Third Countries) Order 1996 (SI 1996 2671). Held: subordinate legislation that had been approved by 
affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parliament could be subject to judicial review on the grounds of 
illegality, procedural impropriety or Wednesbury unreasonableness. The extent of any review on the ground of 
rationality would be dependent on the nature and purpose of the empowering Act. It was apparent, in the instant 
case, that the Secretary of State’s decision should not be subjected to over zealous scrutiny. Having regard to 
evidence concerning the treatment of women and of the Ahmadis, a minority religious group, the Secretary of 
State had been irrational in his conclusion. 
 
Hambleton DC v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2002] P.L.C.R. 1. H issued 
enforcement notices alleging unauthorised change of use of land by the owners, A, who had moved a residential 
caravan, market trader’s caravan and a refrigeration unit on to the land from which they wanted to run a free 
range egg business. A’s appeals against the notices were allowed by the inspector because he found that there 
was a sound financial basis for the business that did not conflict with the local plan. Held: varying the second 
notice by allowing the trader’s caravan and refrigeration unit was irrational, however, as the inspector had 
already decided that it would be inappropriate to impose conditions on the permission in the instant case. 
 
Richmond upon Thames LBC v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (Tree 
Preservation Order) [2001] EWHC Admin 205; [2002] J.P.L. 33.  A larch tree, the subject of a tree preservation 
order, was located in the grounds of property A. H, the owner of an adjoining property, applied for consent for 
the tree to be pruned so as to remove the risk overhanging branches posed to his conservatory. R refused the 
application and H appealed to the Secretary of State. An inspector recommended that H’s appeal should be 
dismissed. The inspector’s report stated that the tree contributed to the general amenity of the area. Further, that 
it was situated so close to the boundary that removing the overhanging branches would not prevent debris falling 
onto H’s conservatory. The inspector concluded that the amenity benefit of the tree outweighed the 
inconvenience involved in removing its debris from the conservatory. The Secretary of State refused to accept 
the inspector’s findings and allowed H’s appeal. R appealed. Held, allowing the appeal and remitting the matter 
to the Secretary of State, that the Secretary of State’s decision was irrational, and the consent itself was 
inadequate because it was impossible to determine precisely which operations could be lawfully carried out. The 
permitted work had not been identified clearly and insufficient reasons had been given for disagreeing with the 
inspector’s recommendations. 
 
R. (on the application of Robin Taylor (t/a David Taylor & Sons (Farms)) v Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] P.L.C.R. 25.  T appealed against the dismissal of his appeal 
against two enforcement notices requiring him to remove a hard surface and deposits of waste materials from his 
farm. The enforcement notices alleged that works undertaken by T amounted to a change of use from 
agricultural use to agricultural use and use for the unauthorised importation and deposit of waste materials, and 
in addition to the carrying out of engineering operations, in each case in breach of planning control. Held: the 
inspector’s failure to exercise that power to allow some waste materials to remain on site, in circumstances 
where the importation of some of the waste material had been reasonable and necessary for agricultural 
purposes, amounted to an irrational exercise of her discretion, and the requirement to remove the waste would 
involve T in unnecessary work and expense. 
 
R. (on the application of Morgan) v Coventry City Council (2001) 4 C.C.L. Rep. 41; [2001] A.C.D. 80.C, who 
was seriously disabled, challenged the decision of CCC to change the charging structure applicable to day care 
provision so as to take into account as income that part of higher rate Disability Living Allowance, DLA, 
payable for night time care. Previously CCC had charged a flat rate for the services they provided but had 
subsequently introduced a means tested system following a detailed consultation exercise with claimants and 
other interested parties. Held: it was irrational, unfair and unlawful for CCC to treat monies intended for night 
time care as being income available for day time care. 
 
R. v Parole Board Ex p. Gordon [2001] A.C.D. 47. G, a mandatory life prisoner, sought judicial review of the 
parole board’s decision not to recommend that he be transferred from closed to open conditions. G contended 
that the decision was irrational as the evidence suggested that a transfer was appropriate, despite a later finding 
that there was an unexplored sexual element to G’s offending. Held: the decision was unlawful as the parole 
board had not carried out fully the balancing exercise required of it as it had only considered the risks of G being 
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moved and had not weighed them against the benefits of transfer. Further, the board had erred by treating 
evidence of R’s earlier failure on the pre-release employment scheme as justifying a conclusion that he should 
not be transferred to open conditions. 
 
R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Jordan [2001] A.C.D. 46. J sought judicial review of the 
parole board’s finding that he was unsuitable for early release. J had been sentenced to six years’ imprisonment 
following a violent attack on his girlfriend whom he had previously stalked and assaulted and contended that the 
board had erred in failing to take proper account of the probation reports and the fact that he had been monitored 
outside prison for several months whilst on home leave. Held, granting the application for judicial review and 
remitting the case, that the parole board’s decision that J needed further work on anger management was 
irrational in view of the conclusion in the probation report that further work was unnecessary. 
 
R. v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board Ex p. T [2001] P.I.Q.R. Q2. T sought judicial review of CICB’s 
refusal to award him compensation for the loss of a leg as a result of a gun shot wound. The Board had 
concluded that it would be inappropriate to make an award because T had several previous convictions for 
robbery and dishonesty offences. T contended that (1) the Board had attached too much weight to the hearsay 
evidence of a police officer who had not been involved in the investigation into the shooting; (2) the form in 
which the Board had given the reasons for its decision had been inadequate, and (3) the finding that he had not 
satisfied the Board that his injury was directly attributable to a crime of violence had been irrational in all the 
circumstances. Held, granting the application, that (1) the Board had clearly been influenced by the police 
officer’s speculative comments that the shooting may have been drugs related and that T may have refused to co-
operate with the investigating officer; (2) whilst the Board had failed to give extended reasons for its decision 
until 14 months after the hearing, the oral reasons given at the conclusion of the hearing, which were 
subsequently confirmed in correspondence, had been sufficient for T to understand the basis of the decision, and 
(3) the finding that T had not shown that his injury resulted from a violent crime had indeed been irrational. 
 
R. (on the application of Tawfick) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] A.C.D. 28. T challenged 
the Secretary of State’s refusal to make an ex gratia compensation award following his wrongful conviction for 
conspiracy to steal. The conviction had been quashed following an unfair trial, where the judge had attacked T’s 
integrity in open court. The Secretary of State refused to make a payment on the basis that the behaviour of the 
judge had not amounted to wholly exceptional circumstances under the second limb of the non-statutory scheme. 
Held, granting the application, that the Secretary of State had applied the wrong test as he had compared the 
actions of the judge in T’s case with the circumstances in R. v Bentley (Derek) [1999] Crim. L.R. 330. The 
correct test under the second limb of the compensation scheme was not whether the case involved an error as 
serious as in Bentley, but whether the conduct of the judge amounted to exceptional circumstances. The attack 
on T’s character was wholly exceptional given that T had appeared in person, the comments were made in the 
context of a trial for a dishonesty offence and were likely to lead the jury to believe that T was a cheat. The 
decision of the Secretary of State was therefore irrational and beyond the range of reasonable responses to the 
test laid down under the scheme. 
 
NOT UNREASONABLE 
 
R. (on the application of Taylor) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWHC 2761.  T applied 
for judicial review of two decisions of the Secretary of State refusing to pay him compensation following the 
quashing of his conviction by the Court of Appeal.  Held: the Secretary of State’s decision could not be 
classified as Wednesbury unreasonable as he had made a permissible decision, considering all he was required to 
consider and not considering anything that he should not have considered. 
 
R. (on the application of Bello) v Lewisham LBC [2002] EWHC 1332; [2002] E.H.L.R. 19.  B sought judicial 
review of a decision made by L on April 5, 2000 to enforce a demolition notice under the Building Act 1984 
s.36, originally served on B in September 1988. The notice related to a rear extension for which no planning 
permission or building regulations approval had been obtained. B contended that the decision to enforce the 
notice after an 11 year delay was Wednesbury unreasonable.  Held: the decision was not Wednesbury 
unreasonable. L had a wide margin of appreciation given the extent of its statutory enforcement powers. 
R. (on the application of Bonyama) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWCA Civ 1353; 
[2002] Imm. A.R. 234. B, a national of Zaire, later the Democratic Republic of Congo, was injured in the civil 
war. The Secretary of State decided he should be returned to Belgium for consideration of his asylum claim. B 
applied for judicial review on the basis that the Secretary of State had failed properly to consider the medical 
evidence. Held: Held, refusing permission to move for judicial review that, it was plain from the decision letter 
that the Secretary of State had fully considered the medical evidence and concluded that the Belgian authorities 
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would provide appropriate protection against any risks involved; the material did not compel a different 
conclusion to that reached by the Secretary of State, which was therefore not Wednesbury unreasonable. 
 
R. (on the application of Anne) v Test Valley BC [2001] EWHC Admin 1019; [2002] Env. L.R. 22. A applied 
for judicial review of the Council’s decision not to serve an abatement notice because no statutory nuisance 
existed. A owned a thatched cottage in an area covered by the Council. A complained that a lime tree growing in 
a neighbouring property was producing honeydew, mould and mould spores which adversely affected A.  Held: 
there was no basis upon which the conclusions reached by the Council’s officer could properly be categorised as 
irrational or Wednesbury unreasonable. 
 
R. (on the application of Hadfield) v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions [2002] 
EWHC 1266; [2002] 26 E.G.C.S. 137. H sought to quash the Secretary of State’s decision to exercise his power 
under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 s.77 to call in an application for planning permission for 
conversion of agricultural buildings to stables and a dwelling. Held: it was clear that the Secretary of State had 
had the relevant policy in mind when making his decision as he had in a letter made reference to a Parliamentary 
answer relating to the selective nature of that policy. His decision was not unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense 
because the proposed development, although small scale, was in conflict with national Green Belt policy by 
virtue of its nature and location. 
Association of British Civilian Internees (Far East Region) v Secretary of State for Defence [2002] EWHC 2119.  
The claimant, an association representing internees in Japan during World War II, sought judicial review of the 
Secretary of State’s decision that in order to qualify for an ex gratia compensatory payment of £10,000, a civilian 
internee had to be a British subject who had been born in the United Kingdom or a British subject who had a 
parent or grandparent who had been born in the UK. Held: t was not unreasonable for the Secretary of State to 
limit eligibility to those with close links to the UK and the criteria were more generous in their ambit than those 
applied to an earlier compensation scheme; the decision of the Secretary of State could not be said to be 
unreasonable and accordingly there had been no breach of the common law principle of equality. 
 
R. (on the application of Molinaro) v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC [2001] EWHC Admin 896; [2002] 
B.L.G.R. 336. M applied for judicial review of the local authority’s decision not to allow M to change the use of 
premises leased by him from the local authority. The lease allowed the premises to be used only as a retail 
delicatessen, in accordance with local planning policy. Over the years, M began selling food to be eaten on the 
premises and applied for planning permission for a change of use. Held: irrationality and breach of fiduciary 
duty were in the circumstances of this case one and the same. The local authority had been in the best position to 
judge local planning need and its decision was not so surprising as to be irrational. 
 
R. (on the application of MacNeil) v HMP Lifer Panel [2001] EWCA Civ 448; (2001) 98 L.S.G. 43. M, a 
convicted murderer who had been released on licence but then recalled to prison following his conviction of a 
further offence, appealed against the dismissal of his application for judicial review of the decision of the parole 
board that he should be detained in open conditions for a period of two years before a review was carried out.  
Held: while a review should take place at reasonable intervals, the unreasonableness of any delay would depend 
on the facts of the case. The decision to delay the review in M’s case for a period of two years was not 
unreasonable and did not contravene Art.5(4) ECHR. 
 
R. v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Ex p. Isle of Wight Council (2001) 3 L.G.L.R. 16; [2000] C.O.D. 
245.  IWC sought judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision not to include the Isle of Wight in the 
classification of areas to receive development funding under two schemes, (a) Regional Selective Assistance, 
RSA, under the Industrial Development Act 1982, and (b) Objective 2 proposals under the European 
Community’s structural funds scheme outlined in EC Treaty Art.158 to Art.161. IWC argued that the decision 
was Wednesbury unreasonable in relation to RSA as SST had failed (1) to give appropriate weight to the 
economic disadvantages suffered by the Isle of Wight because of its island status, as required by EC Treaty 
Art.158 (now, after amendment Art.214 EC); (2) to properly take account of the very high levels of 
unemployment and the factor of insularity, and (3) in relation to Objective 2, IWC, whilst recognising that the 
Isle of Wight did not meet the criteria for inclusion in Objective 2, argued that SSTI should have put the Isle of 
Wight forward as a special case because of its high levels of unemployment and its insularity.  Held: as the 
decision involved considerations of national economic policy, the threshold for a finding of Wednesbury 
unreasonableness was higher than in other matters, and it had not been met by IWC’s arguments. 
 
R. (on the application of Jones) v Mansfield DC [2003] EWHC 7; [2003] N.P.C. 5. J applied for judicial review 
of the local planning authority’s decision to grant outline planning permission for the development of an 
industrial estate opposite her home. J contended that it had been unreasonable for the planning committee to 
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decide that the development was unlikely to have significant environmental effects for the purposes of the Town 
and Country Planning (Assessment of Environmental Effects) Regulations 1988 Reg.2(1) and Reg.4(1) so that 
there was no obligation to conduct an environmental impact assessment, EIA, prior to the grant of planning 
permission. Held: it had not been unreasonable for the local authority to take the view that it could decide on the 
likelihood of significant environmental effects on the basis of the large body of information available, even 
though it was not complete.  Moreover, there was also considerable material as to the potential impact on bats, 
but no evidence of their presence on the site and no evidence of loss of other wildlife habitats which could render 
the local authority’s decision unreasonable. 
 
R. (on the application of Persey) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2002] 
EWHC 371; [2002] 3 W.L.R. 704. A number of claimants, all of whom had been affected by the outbreak of foot 
and mouth disease in 2001, applied for judicial review of the decision of the Government to set up three separate 
independent inquiries into the outbreak. The three inquiries were to receive evidence mainly in private. The 
claimants maintained that only an open public inquiry would be sufficient.  Held: it was wrong to presume that 
an open public inquiry would be the remedy for all matters. There was no “uniform practice” as to what form an 
inquiry would take; it was doubtful that there was a legal presumption that any public inquiry was required to sit 
openly.  It followed that the decision had not been irrational or otherwise unlawful. 
 
R. (on the application of B) v Wakefield Prison Governor [2001] EWHC Admin 917; [2002] 1 F.C.R. 445. B, a 
discretionary life sentence prisoner, sought judicial review of the prison governor’s refusal to grant permission 
for visits from his young nephew, and the Secretary of State’s policy which introduced child protection measures 
for prison visits. B had a previous conviction for the gross indecency of an eight year old boy and one for the 
indecent assault of a boy in a detention centre.  Held: the weight to be attached to factors under consideration 
was a matter for the decision maker. The governor’s decision was not irrational and he had been entitled to 
conclude that B’s sister’s child care difficulties should not outweigh considerations of her son’s welfare and to 
attach limited weight to the observations of the social workers. 
Mansard County Homes Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] EWHC 
Admin 704; [2002] P.L.C.R. 20.  M sought to quash a decision of the local authority planning inspector 
dismissing an appeal against a refusal to grant outline planning permission for a residential development which 
would have involved severance of a disused railway line. The inspector had decided that the proposal was 
contrary to the aims and intentions of those elements of the local structure plan and the emerging local plan that 
sought to safeguard future public transport options. These policies derived from Planning Policy Guidance Note 
13, PPG13, which stated at paragraph 5.8 that disused transport routes should not be “unnecessarily severed by 
new buildings and non transport land uses, especially where there [was] a reasonable chance that such routes 
[might] be put to use in the future”.  Held: t was entirely comprehensible that the Secretary of State would wish 
to keep future transport options open and as such PPG13 could not be described as irrational or unreasonable. 
Having established the materiality of PPG13, it was up to the planning inspector to accord appropriate weight to 
the policy. 
 
BT3G Ltd v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2001] EWCA Civ 1448; [2001] 3 C.M.L.R. 61. BT and 
OO, telecommunications companies, appealed against the refusal ([2001] Eu. L.R. 325) of their application for 
judicial review of decisions of the Secretary of State concerned with the auction of licences for the “third 
generation” of mobile telephones, also known as the “Universal Mobile Telecommunications System” or UMTS. 
Under the auction rules, each licence had to be paid for as soon as it was granted. OO and BT were each granted 
a licence and paid the required fee. Other applicants, V and O, were associated companies and whilst their 
licence bids were accepted, the rules required that as a precondition of the grant of a licence they must cease to 
be associated. The resultant delay whilst V divested itself of O, meant that the licences were not granted for 
approximately four months which resulted in a saving to V and O on the substantial cost of financing the licence 
fee when compared with BT and OO.  Held: Any bidder could have become subject to a precondition at any 
stage in the bidding process and the auction rules would have been applied in exactly the same way to any such 
bidder. Having regard to the Secretary of State’s paramount concern to ensure that there should be no association 
between licence holders, his conduct could not be regarded as in any way irrational or unfair. 
 
R. (on the application of United Kingdom Renderers Association Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions [2001] EWHC Admin 675; [2002] Env. L.R. 21. An association representing British 
animal renderers, sought judicial review of a guidance note issued by the Secretary of State in order to further 
the aims of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. U complained that the provisions of the guidance note, 
requiring renderers to use all due diligence and take all reasonable steps to prevent the escape of offensive 
odours beyond the boundary of the processing site, conflicted with the provisions of the Act which required that 
the best available techniques, not entailing excessive cost, were to be used.  Held: the Secretary of State was not 
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required to demonstrate any technical or scientific basis for the guidance, therefore a failure by the Secretary of 
State to demonstrate a technical or scientific basis for the compatibility of an odour boundary condition with the 
“best available techniques, not entailing excessive cost,” test did not mean that the guidance had been shown to 
be irrational and unlawful. 
 
Terry v Craze [2001] EWCA Civ 1094; [2002] Q.B. 312. T appealed against the refusal of her application for 
judicial review ([2001] Q.B. 559) of the coroner’s decision not to hold an inquest into the death of her husband, 
who had been exposed to asbestos at work for many years. The coroner had obtained a post-mortem examination 
report under the Coroners Act 1988 s.19 which stated that the cause of death was not asbestosis.  Held: in 
circumstances where the coroner refused to hold an inquest, the court did not have the power to order one unless 
he had erred in law or his conclusion as to fact was irrational. In the instant case, the lower court had not erred in 
upholding the decision of the coroner that there was no reasonable cause to suspect that T’s husband had died of 
asbestosis. 
 
R. (on the application of Barker) v Waverley BC [2001] EWCA Civ 566; [2002] 1 P. & C.R. 6. WBC and BAE 
appealed against an order quashing WBC’s decision to remove a condition attached to BAE’s planning 
permission in respect of an aerodrome site, which stated that the land would revert to agricultural use following 
BAE’s cessation of use, of which notice had been given. WBC’s decision was quashed following an appeal by B, 
the local residents, on the grounds that an immaterial consideration had been taken into account, the removal of 
the condition was irrational, and that B had a legitimate expectation that the condition would continue on 
account of the length of time it had been in place.  Held, allowing the appeal, that the potentially immaterial 
consideration was only referred to in one paragraph of the planning officer’s report and it was unlikely that it had 
influenced members, given that it was their role to consider planning issues. Further, the removal of the 
condition was not irrational because it was not beyond the responses of a reasonable decision maker given the 
considerations highlighted in the planning officer’s report,  
 
R. (on the application of Tucker) v Secretary of State for Social Security [2001] EWCA Civ 1646; [2002] H.L.R. 
27. T contended that (1) the Secretary of State’s decision to amend the Regulations as he did was Wednesbury 
unreasonable and disproportionate since there was no basis for the underlying assumption that a parent should be 
responsible for providing accommodation for his child; (2) there should have been a reverse burden of proof 
provision and that it was unreasonable not to provide transitional provisions excluding T, who was a recipient of 
housing benefit under the previous Regulations, and who would have ordered her life accordingly. Held, 
dismissing the appeal, that (1) the judge was correct in finding that irrationality was not proved and that 
assumption underlying Regulation 7(1)(d)’s was based on a rational belief that where the tenant was a parent and 
carer of the landlord’s child, the landlord would not generally consider the tenancy in the usual commercial 
manner; (2) the absence of a reverse burden of proof was not unreasonable as it was hard to refute evidence of a 
tenancy provided by the tenant or landlord. 
 
R. (on the application of Wirral MBC) v Chief Schools Adjudicator [2001] E.L.R. 574. WMBC challenged a 
decision of C that its proposals to carry out selection tests for entry to grammar schools in its area, prior to the 
expression by parents of their preference as to secondary school, was unfair and therefore unlawful. C had found 
that the testing was part of the admissions arrangements and that the procedure would adversely affect parents 
with a preference for the comprehensive schools in the area which were oversubscribed. WMBC contended that 
the decision was irrational.  Held, refusing the application for judicial review, the adjudicator’s decision that one 
group of parents should not have a chance of its first preference without risking its second, although apparently 
harsh to the group which lost a benefit, was not irrational. 
 
R. v Legal Aid Board Ex p. Burrows [2001] EWCA Civ 205; [2001] 2 F.L.R. 998. B, who had acted for the 
mother of a child in connection with an application for a care order under the Children Act 1989 s.31, appealed 
against the refusal of his application for judicial review of the decision of the Legal Aid Board to limit the costs 
payable to him to the sum of £5,000, that being the costs limitation set under the relevant legal aid certificate. 
Held: the imposition of financial limitations on legal aid certificates ensured that no more than was reasonable 
and proportionate was spent on publicly funded civil litigation and could not therefore be described as irrational. 
 
R (on the application of Assisted Reproduction and Gynaecology Centre) and another v Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority [2002] EWCA Civ 20, [2003] 1 F.C.R. 266. A sought permission to seek judicial review 
of a decision by HFEA not to authorise the implantation of more than three embryos in a particular patient. The 
HFEA code of practice stipulated that no more than three embryos were to be implanted in a woman in any 
single fertilisation cycle. A contended that, whilst the general prescription on the numbers of embryos to be 
transferred was reasonable, it was nevertheless appropriate to authorise a departure from the normal rule in the 
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case of a patient who had undergone eight previous unsuccessful attempts at in vitro fertilisation. Held, refusing 
the application, that the court had no authority to intervene to quash the decision of HFEA in circumstances 
where careful and thorough consideration had been given to the matter and an opinion provided that was plainly 
rational. The subject matter under consideration formed part of a rapidly developing area of scientific knowledge 
and debate. It was not the function of the court to enter into scientific debate nor to adjudicate upon the merits of 
the decisions made by the authority or any advice that it might give. Whilst the decisions of the authority were 
open to judicial review, they were only amenable to such scrutiny in circumstances where the authority had 
either exceeded or abused its powers. 
 
R. v Collins Ex p. Brady 2000] Lloyd’s Rep. Med. 355. B, a prisoner on hunger strike, applied for judicial 
review of the decision of C, his responsible medical officer, and AHA, the hospital in which he was held, to 
force feed him. The decision had been purportedly made pursuant to the Mental Health Act 1983 s.63. Held, 
refusing the application, that (1) where the decision of a responsible medical officer to administer treatment 
without consent pursuant to s.63 of the Act was the subject of a challenge, the appropriate test was that of the 
reasonableness of the decision in the Wednesbury sense rather than the “precedent fact” test, R. v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department Ex p. Khawaja [1984] A.C. 74 distinguished. Given that s.63 was a derogation 
from the human rights of self determination and bodily integrity, the appropriate Wednesbury test was that 
established in R. v Ministry of Defence Ex p. Smith [1996] Q.B. 517. 
 
R. (on the application of Gravett) v Criminal Injury Compensation Appeals Panel  [2001] EWHC Admin 1193; 
(2002) 67 B.M.L.R. 21. G sought judicial review of C’s decision that an injury for which she made a claim was 
not a direct result of a crime of violence. G was a nurse, and alleged that she had been assaulted by W at his 
home in the course of her duties. The police had investigated the incident, and an officer had visited W with the 
purpose of arresting him. However, no arrest was made and no charges were brought. The crime report indicated 
that there was a decision not to prosecute in the public interest because W was senile. Held, refusing the 
application, on the facts there was no proper basis for suggesting that aspects of the evidence had been given 
improper weight or other reasons for suggesting that no reasonable tribunal could have come to the conclusion 
that C had done. 
 
 
